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Recent years have been marked by important developments in artificial intelligence (AI). 
These developments have highlighted serious limitations in human rationality and shown 
that computers can be highly creative. There are also important positive outcomes for 
psychologists studying creativity. It is now possible to design entirely new classes of 
experiments that are more promising than the simple tasks typically used for studying 
creativity in psychology. In addition, given the current and future AI algorithms for developing 
new data structures and programs, novel theories of creativity are on the horizon. Thus, 
AI opens up entire new avenues for studying human creativity in psychology.
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In psychology, research into creativity 1 has tended to follow well-trodden paths: simple tests 
of creativity (e.g., alternative uses test), correlations with measures of intelligence, and more 
recently neural correlates of creativity such as EEG and fMRI (e.g., Weisberg, 2006; Runco, 
2014)2. One line of research that has been little explored is to use progress in artificial intelligence 
(AI) to generate tools for studying human creativity.
Developments of AI have been impressive. DeepMind’s AlphaGo has easily beaten the best 
human grandmasters in Go, a game that for many years had seemed beyond the reach of AI 
(Silver et  al., 2016). IBM’s Watson mastered natural language and knowledge to the point that 
it outclassed the best human players in Jeopardy! – a game show where contestants have to 
find the question to an answer (Ferrucci, 2012). Not less impressive, we  are now on the brink 
of having self-driving cars and automated assistants able to book appointment by phone (Smith 
and Anderson, 2014). These developments raise profound issues about human identity; they 
also pose difficult but exciting questions about the very nature of human creativity and indeed 
rationality. But they also present novel opportunities for studying human creativity. Entirely 
new classes of experiments can be  devised, going way beyond the simple tasks typically used 
1 It is notably difficult to define “creativity,” and a large number of definitions exist with little agreement among researchers 
(see e.g., Hennessey and Amabile, 2010). In this article, we  focus on what Boden (1990) calls “historical creativity” 
(concerning products that are considered novel by society at large) rather than “psychological creativity” (concerning 
products that are novel only for the agent producing them). Thus, if Joe Bloggs for the first time of his life realizes 
that a brick can be  used as a pen holder, this is psychological but not historical creativity. If he  is the first ever to 
claim that a brick can be  used as an abstract rendition of Beethoven’s 5th Symphony, this is both psychological and 
historical creativity according to Boden’s definition.
2 While the aim of this Perspective Article is not to provide a review of the extensive literature on creativity in psychology 
and neuroscience, a few additional pointers might be  helpful to the reader: Cristofori et  al. (2018); Kaufman and 
Sternberg (2019); and Simonton (2014).
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so far for studying creativity, and new theories of creativity 
can be  developed.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
AND CREATIVITY
Using AI for understanding creativity has a long history and 
is currently an active domain of research with annual international 
conferences (for reviews, see Meheus and Nickles, 2009; Colton 
and Wiggins, 2012). As early as 1957, Newell, Simon, and 
Shaw had programmed Logic Theorist to prove theorems in 
symbolic logic. Not only did this research lead to an influential 
theory of problem-solving (Newell et  al., 1958) but it also 
shed important light on human creativity, as Logic Theorist 
was able to prove some theorems in a more elegant way than 
Russell and Whitehead, two of the leading mathematicians of 
the twentieth century (Gobet and Lane, 2015). There are 
numerous examples of AI creativity in science today (Sozou 
et  al., 2017). For example, at Aberystwyth University, a “robot 
scientist” specialized in functional genomics not only produced 
hypotheses independently but also designed experiments for 
testing these hypotheses, physically performed them and then 
interpreted the results (King et  al., 2004).
In the arts, British abstract painter Harold Cohen all but 
abandoned a successful career as an artist to understand his 
own creative processes. To do so, he wrote a computer program, 
AARON, able to make drawings and later color paintings 
autonomously (McCorduck, 1990). More recently, several 
programs have displayed high levels of creativity in the arts. 
For example, a deep-learning algorithm produced a Rembrandt-
like portrait (Flores and Korsten, 2016) and the program Aiva, 
also using deep learning, composes classical music (Aiva 
Technologies, 2018). An album of Aiva’s music has already 
been released, and its pieces are used in films and by advertising 
agencies. In chess, the program CHESTHETICA automatically 
composes chess problems and puzzles that are considered by 
humans as esthetically pleasing (Iqbal et  al., 2016).
However, AI has had only little impact on creativity research 
in psychology (for an exception, see Olteţeanu and Falomir’s, 
2015, 2016 work on modelling the Remote Associate Test and 
the Alternative Uses Test). There is only passing mention if 
at all in textbooks and handbooks of creativity (e.g., Kaufman 
and Sternberg, 2006; Runco, 2014), and mainstream research 
simply ignores it. In our view, this omission is a serious mistake.
THE SPECTER OF BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY
AI has uncovered clear limits in human creativity, as is well 
illustrated by Go and chess, two board games requiring creativity 
when played competitively. After losing 3–0 against computer 
program AlphaGo Master in 2017, Chinese Go grandmaster 
Ke Jie, the world No. 1, declared: “After humanity spent thousands 
of years improving our tactics, computers tell us that humans 
are completely wrong… I  would go as far as to say not a 
single human has touched the edge of the truth of Go” (Kahn, 
2017). Astonishingly, this version of AlphaGo, which won not 
only all its games against Ke Jie but also against other leading 
Go grandmasters, was beaten 89–11 a few months later by 
AlphaGo Zero, a new version of the program that learns from 
scratch by playing against itself, thus creating all its knowledge 
except for the rules of the game (Silver et  al., 2016, 2017).
Ke Jie’s remark is echoed by chess grandmasters’ comments 
(Gobet, 2018). In the second game of his 1997 match against 
Deep Blue, Kasparov and other grandmasters were astonished 
by the computer’s sophisticated and creative way of first building 
a positional advantage and then denying any counter-play for 
Kasparov. Kasparov’s surprise was such that he  accused IBM 
and the programming team behind Deep Blue of cheating, a 
charge that he  maintained for nearly 20  years. More recently, 
in the sixth game of the 2006 match between Deep Fritz and 
world champion Vladimir Kramnik, the computer played a 
curious rook maneuver that commentators ridiculed as typical 
of a duffer. As the game unfolded, it became clear that this 
maneuver was a very creative way of provoking weaknesses 
on Kramnik’s kingside, which allowed Deep Blue to unleash 
a fatal offensive on the other side of the board.
In general, these limits in rationality and creativity are in 
line with Simon’s theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1956, 
1997; Gobet and Lane, 2012; Gobet, 2016a), which proposed 
that limitations in knowledge and computational capacity drastically 
constrain a decision maker’s ability to make rational choices. 
These limits are also fully predictable from what we  know from 
research in cognitive psychology. For example, Bilalić et al. (2008) 
showed that even experts can be  blinded by their knowledge, 
with the consequence that they prefer standard answers to novel 
and creative answers, even when the latter are objectively better. 
Thus, when a common solution comes first to mind, it is very 
hard to find another one (a phenomenon known as the Einstellung 
effect). In Bilalić et al.’s chess experiment, the effect was powerful: 
compared to a control group, the strength of the Einstellung 
group decreased by about one standard deviation.
The power of long-term memory schemas and preconceptions 
is a common theme in the history of science and art and has 
often thwarted creativity. For example, in the early 1980s, the 
unquestioned wisdom was that stomach ulcers were caused by 
excess acid, spicy food, and stress. The genius of Marshall and 
Warren (1984) in their Nobel-winning discovery was to jettison 
all these assumptions before hypothesizing that a bacterium 
(helicobacter pylori) was the main culprit. Finding ways to 
overcome such mind-sets is an important task for fostering human 
creativity (Gobet et  al., 2014), as they are common with normal 
cognition. In some instances, in order to be  creative and explore 
new conceptual spaces, it is necessary to break these mind-sets, 
either by inhibiting some specific concepts or groups of concepts, 
or by eschewing concepts altogether. AI systems can use a large 
variety of different methods – some similar to those used by 
humans, some entirely dissimilar. Thus, they are less likely to 
be  subject to such mind-sets and could provide humans with 
useful alternatives for developing creative products.
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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE OFFERS 
NOVEL METHODS FOR STUDYING 
CREATIVITY
When considering the literature on creativity in psychology, 
it is hard to escape the feeling that something is amiss in 
this field of research. A considerable amount of research has 
studied simple tasks that are remote from real creativity in 
the arts and science – for example, alternative uses task, word 
generation task, and insight problems (see e.g., Runco, 2014) – 
but it is at the least debatable whether these tasks tell us 
much about real creativity. As support for this critique of the 
lack of ecological validity of many tasks used in the field, 
numerous experiments have found that these tasks correlate 
more with general intelligence (g) and verbal intelligence than 
with real-world creativity (Wallach, 1970; Silvia, 2015). In 
addition, in their review of the literature, Zeng et  al. (2011) 
conclude that divergent-thinking tests suffer from six major 
weaknesses, including poor predictive, ecological, and 
discriminant validities. (For a more positive evaluation, see 
Plucker and Makel, 2010.) While some researchers have developed 
tasks that map more directly into the kind of tasks carried 
out in real-world creativity – see in particular the research 
on scientific discovery (Klahr and Dunbar, 1988; Dunbar, 1993) – 
this approach is relatively underrepresented in research 
into creativity.
A similar concern can be  voiced with respect to 
experimentation and theory development. Although a fair 
amount of avenues have been explored – including generation 
and selection (e.g., Simonton, 1999), heuristic search (e.g., 
Newell et  al., 1962), problem finding (e.g., Getzels and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976), systems theories (e.g., Gruber, 1981), 
explanations based on intelligence (e.g., Eysenck, 1995), and 
psychopathological explanations (e.g., Post, 1994) – entire 
experimental and theoretical spaces have been fully ignored 
or, in the best case, barely scratched. Clearly, this is due to 
the limits imposed by human bounded rationality, to which 
one should add the constraints imposed by the limited time 
resources available.
AI can help with both empirical and theoretical research. 
Empirically, it can simulate complex worlds that challenge 
human creativity; theoretically, it can help develop new theories 
by inhibiting some concepts (see above), making unexpected 
connections between known mechanisms or proposing wholly 
new explanations. Here we  focus on scientific discovery, but 
similar conclusions can be  reached for creativity in the arts.
A New Way of Designing Experiments
AI can be  used as a new way to perform experiments on 
creativity. The central idea is to exploit current technology 
to design complex environments that can be  studied with a 
creative application of the scientific method. Thus, these 
experiments go way beyond the simple tasks typically used 
in creativity research. Rather than studying creativity asking 
people to generate words that are related to three stimulus 
words as in the Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1962), one 
studies it by asking participants to find the laws of a simulated 
world. This is of course what Dunbar, Klahr, and others did 
in earlier experiments (Klahr and Dunbar, 1988; Dunbar, 
1993). The key contribution here is to propose to use much 
more complex environments, including environments where 
the presence of intelligent agents approximates the complexity 
of studying phenomena affected by humans, as is the case 
in psychology and sociology. Thus, where standard programming 
techniques are sufficient for simulating physical worlds with 
no intelligent agents, AI techniques make it possible to simulate 
much more complex worlds, which incorporate not only 
physical and biological laws, but also psychosocial laws. In 
both cases, the participants’ task is to reverse-engineer at 
least some of the laws of the domains – that it to make 
scientific discoveries about these domains. Thus, for example, 
participants must devise experiments for understanding the 
learning mechanisms of agents inhabiting a specific world. 
The mechanisms and laws underpinning these worlds can 
be  similar to those currently postulated in science, or wholly 
different with new laws of physics, biology, or psychology. 
In that case, the situation is akin to scientists exploring life 
on a new planet.
These environments can be used with several goals in mind. 
First, they can test current theories of creativity and scientific 
discovery. The worlds can be  designed in such a way that 
their understanding is facilitated by the mechanisms proposed 
by some theories as opposed to others (e.g., heuristic search 
might be  successful, but randomly generating concepts might 
not, or vice versa). Additional questions include whether 
participants adapt their strategy as a function of the results 
they obtain and whether they develop new experimental designs 
where necessary. Second, these environments can be  used to 
observe new empirical phenomena related to creativity, such 
as the generation of as yet unknown strategies. New phenomena 
are bound to occur, as the complexity of the proposed tasks 
is larger by several orders of magnitude than the tasks typically 
studied in psychology.
A third use is to identify creative people in a specific domain, 
for example in biology or psychology. As creativity is measured 
in a simulated environment that is close to the target domain, 
one is more likely to correctly identify individuals that might 
display creativity in the domain. If one wishes, one can correlate 
performance in the task and other behavioral measures with 
standard psychological measures such as IQ, motivation, 
and psychoticism.
A final use is to train people to be  creative in a specific 
domain. Variables in the environment can be manipulated such 
that specific skills are taught, for example the efficient use of 
heuristics or standard research methods in science. The difficulty 
of finding laws can be  manipulated as well: from a clear linear 
relation between two variables to non-linear relations between 
several variables with several sources of noise. The reader will 
have noticed that such environments are not dissimilar from 
some video games, and this game-like feature can be  used to 
foster enjoyment and motivation, and thus learning.
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Please note that we  make no claim that training creativity 
in one domain will provide something like general creativity, 
as is sometimes proposed in the literature (e.g., De Bono, 
1970). There is now very strong experimental evidence that 
skills acquired in a domain do not generalize to new domains 
sharing few commonalities with the original one (Gobet, 2016b; 
Sala and Gobet, 2017a), and this conclusion almost certainly 
also applies to creativity. One possible reason for this lack of 
far transfer is that expertise relies on the ability of recognizing 
patterns that are specific to a domain (Sala and Gobet, 2017b). 
It is possible to speculate that being creative relies, at least 
in part, on recognizing rare domain-specific patterns in a 
problem situation. For example, to go back to the example of 
discovering that stomach ulcers are caused by bacteria, Warren 
recognized the presence of bacteria in gastric specimens 
he  studied with a microscope, although this was not expected 
as it was thought that the stomach was a sterile environment 
inhospitable for bacteria (Thagard, 1998). However, we  do 
recognize that this is a hypothesis that should be  tested, and 
it could turn out that, in fact, creativity is a general ability. 
This is an empirical question that can only be  settled with 
new experiments, and the methods proposed in this paper 
may contribute to its answer.
Automatic Generation of Theories
As noted above, human bounded rationality has the consequence 
that humans only explore a very small number of subspaces 
within the space of all possible theories, and even these subspaces 
are explored only sparsely. Mind-sets and other biases mean 
that even bad hypotheses are maintained while more promising 
ones are ignored. AI can help break these shackles.
The subfield of AI known as computational scientific 
discovery has been active for decades, spearheaded by Herbert 
Simon’s seminal work (Newell et  al., 1962; Bradshaw et  al., 
1983). The aim is precisely to develop algorithms that can 
produce creative behavior in science, either replicating famous 
scientific discoveries or making original contributions (for a 
review, see Sozou et  al., 2017). Due to space constraints, 
we  limit ourselves to the description of only one 
approach – Automatic Generation of Theories (AGT) (Lane 
et  al., 2014) – which is particularly relevant to our discussion 
as it excels in avoiding being stuck in  local minima, contrary 
to human cognition which is notably prone to mind-sets, 
Einstellung effects, and other cognitive biases. In a nutshell, 
the central ideas of AGT are (1) to consider theories as 
computer programs; (2) to use a probabilistic algorithm (genetic 
programming) to build those programs; (3) to simulate the 
protocols of the original experiments; (4) to compare the 
predictions of the theories with empirical data in order to 
compute the quality (fitness) of the theories; and (5) to use 
fitness to evolve better theories, using mechanisms of selection, 
mutation, and crossover. Simulations have shown that the 
methodology is able to produce interesting theories with simple 
experiments. With relentless progress in technology, it is likely 
that this and other approaches in artificial scientific discovery 
will provide theoretical explanations for more complex human 
behaviors, including creativity itself.
Challenges
The two uses of AI proposed in this paper for studying creativity 
in psychology are not meant to replace current methods, but 
to add to the arsenal of theoretical concepts and experimental 
techniques available to researchers. Nor are they proposed as 
magic bullets that will answer all questions related to creativity. 
Our point is that these uses of AI present potential benefits 
that have been overlooked by psychologists studying creativity.
As any new approach, these uses raise conceptual and 
methodological challenges. Regarding the proposed method for 
collecting data, challenges include the way participants’ results 
will be  scored and compared, and how they will be  used to 
test theories. A related challenge concerns the kind of theory 
suitable to account for these data; given the complexity and 
richness of the data, it is likely that computational models 
will be  necessary – possibly models generated by the second 
use of AI we  proposed.
Similarly, using AI for generating theories raises interesting 
practical and theoretical questions. Will the generated theories 
be understandable to humans, or will they only be black boxes 
providing correct outputs (predictions) given a description of 
the task at hand and other kind of information such as the 
age of the participants? Will their structure satisfy canons of 
parsimony in science? How will they link epistemologically 
to other theories in psychology, for example theories of memory 
and decision-making? Will they be  useful for practical 
applications such as training experts to be  creative in their 
specialty? In addition, there is of course the question as to 
what kind of AI is best suited for generating theories. We have 
provided the example of genetic programming, but many other 
techniques can be  advanced as candidates, including adaptive 
production systems (Klahr et  al., 1987) and deep learning 
(LeCun et  al., 2015).
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Recent developments in AI signal a new relationship between 
human and machine. Interesting albeit perhaps threatening 
questions are posed about our human nature and, specifically, 
the meaning of creativity. These include philosophical and 
ethical questions. Can a product be  creative if it is conceived 
by a computer? If so, who owns the research? Should computer 
programs be  listed as co-authors of scientific papers? How 
will the synergy between human and computer creativity evolve? 
Should some types of creativity – e.g., generating fake news 
for political aims – be  curtailed or even banned?
These developments also raise significant questions about 
human rationality, as discussed above. In doing so, they 
highlight the magnificent achievements of some human 
creators, such as Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart or Pablo Picasso. 
In addition, they have substantial implications for creativity 
in science and the arts. Entirely new conceptual spaces might 
be  explored, with computer programs either working 
independently or co-designing creative products with humans. 
In science – the focus of this perspective article – this 
might lead to the development of novel research strategies, 
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methodologies, types of experiments, theories, and theoretical 
frameworks. Of particular interest is the possibility of mixing 
concepts and mechanisms between different subfields (e.g., 
between memory research and decision-making research), 
between different fields (e.g., psychology and chemistry), 
and even between science and the arts. As discussed above, 
there are also some new exciting opportunities for training. 
It is only with the aid of artificial creativity that we  will 
break our mind-sets and reach a new understanding of 
human creativity.
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